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NOTES
PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. CITY OF




Traditional media engaged in the dissemination of speech receive varying
degrees of first amendment protection.' Because of the relative infancy of
the cable television industry,2 the applicable standards of first amendment
protection are still evolving.3 During the developmental stages of cable reg-
1. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld government regulations of the editorial
functions of radio and television but has struck down comparable regulations when applied to
newspapers. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking
down state statute requiring newspapers to give political candidates equal reply time to edito-
rial attacks), with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the
"fairness doctrine" as applied to broadcasters and basing the government's right to regulate
the content of broadcast editorials on the medium's scarcity of spectrum space).
2. Cable television systems disseminate information, news, and entertainment by retrans-
mitting programs of broadcast stations and by originating programs and special services. By
way of an antenna, a cable system can receive local and distant broadcast signals and then
transmit those signals to home television sets of subscribers. Most recently, systems originate
and transmit their own programming, a process called cablecasting. See Midwest Video Corp.
v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); see also Omega
Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1982); Note, Cable
Television: The Practical Implications of Local Regulation and Control, 27 DRAKE L. REV.
391, 391-92 (1978) (discussing the evolution of the cable medium from a retransmitter of
broadcasting programs to an initiator of its own programs or information); Note, Cable
Franchising and the First Amendment: Does the Franchising Process Contravene First Amend-
ment Rights 36 FED. COM. L.J. 317, 319-20 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Cable
Franchising].
3. Cable television dates back to the 1950's when community antenna systems (CATV)
simply provided better reception and carried more distant broadcast signals into the home. By
the end of the decade there were roughly 640 cable systems serving approximately 650,000
subscribers. See Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 77, 79-81 (1981). Six percent of the nation's households were cable subscribers
by 1969 and the numbers continued to grow throughout the 1970's to more than 14 million
subscribers-nearly 20% of all television households. Id. at 79. In the mid- 1970's the techno-
logical development of cable systems and satellite service spurred the expansion of cable televi-
sion systems. Cable companies began to offer nonbroadcast channels featuring movies,
sporting events, religious programs, and special shows for children. Id. at 81.
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ulation,4 operators seeking first amendment protection of their activities fre-
quently have attacked two separate areas of governmental regulation: the
establishment of channel and programming requirements5 and the licensing
process itself.6
Responding to these challenges, courts have consistently recognized that
cable operators engage in activities protected by the first amendment, 7 but
have been unable to establish firmly the permissible scope of government
regulation. Bereft of any well-defined first amendment standards, courts
have divided on the extent of protection the industry should be afforded.' In
determining the extent of permissible government regulation, courts have
focused on the characteristics of the cable medium.9 In so doing, they pri-
marily have compared the cable medium to two other traditional media
models, broadcasting and the printed press, to determine whether sufficient
similarities exist to justify the application of the respective regulatory
constraints. 10
4. See Albert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L.
REV. 501 (1977) (discussing FCC and local government jurisdiction over the cable television
industry); see also Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC, the First Amend-
ment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 133, 138-43 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding FCC "must-carry" rules unconstitutional); Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1029 (chal-
lenge to FCC mandatory access and channel capacity requirements); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (challenge to FCC program
limitations); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983),
vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985) (challenge to state regulations that require cable
operators to dedicate certain channels for public access).
6. See, e.g., Tele-Communications v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(challenge to United States Air Force refusal to grant a cable franchise); Omega Satellite
Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982) (challenge to city ordinance
requiring cable system to obtain cable franchise); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579
F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (challenge to city's franchise bidding system). Cf Hopkins-
ville Cable TV v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (challenge to
city's refusal to grant cable franchise).
7. See, e.g., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127; Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mid-
west Video, 571 F.2d at 1054 (dictum); Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. at 1562; Berkshire, 571 F.
Supp. at 980.
8. Compare Tele-Communications, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (criticizing licensing
regulations on first amendment grounds), with Community Communications, 660 F.2d 1370
(10th Cir. 1981) (licensing regulations upheld based on cable's disruption of the public
domain).
9. See, e.g., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 128; Community Communications, 660 F.2d at
1377-79; Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1053-57.
10. Compare Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1379, and Berkshire, 571 F. Supp.
at 984-85 (courts reject comparison between newspapers and cable), with Midwest Video, 571
F.2d at 1056 (analogizes newspapers and cablecasting).
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In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a city's franchising
procedure could be an unconstitutional infringement upon the first amend-
ment rights of cable operators.' 2 The Ninth Circuit first engaged in a tradi-
tional first amendment analysis focusing on the nature of the medium being
regulated.' 3 The court then shifted its focus away from the characteristics of
the medium to examine the type of public property to which access was
being sought.' 4 Here, the court applied the public forum doctrine and found
the city's refusal to provide a cable franchise unconstitutional,' 5 at least
where the available facilities were potentially capable of accommodating ad-
ditional systems.' 6
Preferred Communications, Inc. (PCI), in an effort to set up a cable televi-
sion system in Los Angeles, approached two utility companies to negotiate
an agreement for use of their poles and conduit space.' 7 Both utilities re-
quired that PCI first obtain a city franchise to provide cable service.' 8 Los
Angeles refused PCI's franchise request because it had not participated in an
auction where the city awarded one franchise to each region.'9
PCI then brought suit against the city alleging that the refusal to award it
a franchise was a deprivation of first and fourteenth amendment rights, as
well as a violation of federal antitrust laws and various other state laws.2 °
The trial court granted the city's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted 2 finding that the city's franchis-
ing process did not violate the first and fourteenth amendment rights of a
It. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
12. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1411.
13. Id. at 1403-07.
14. Id. at 1405-09.
15. Id. at 1407-09.
16. Id. at 1411.
17. Id. at 1400.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1401. The California Government Code authorizes the licensing of a cable
television system by a local municipality. See CAL. CODE § 53066 (West Supp. 1984). Los
Angeles allocates cable franchises through an auction process. A company wishing to partici-
pate in the auction must pay or promise to pay a number of fees and must submit a detailed
proposal outlining its proposed operations for a nine-year period. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1400.
Furthermore, the company must demonstrate that it has a strong financial base and "good
character," that its operations constitute "sound business plans," and that it has "demon-
strated business experience." Id. Bidders also must agree to share a percentage of future
annual gross revenues with the city, to provide certain customer services, and to provide vari-
ous mandatory access and leased channels. Id.
20. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1399. The court dismissed without prejudice the two alleged
state law violations for refiling in state court. Id. at 1399 n. 1.
21. Id. at 1399 (complaint dismissed without leave to amend pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)).
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prospective cable operator and that the city was immune from antitrust
liability.22
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed
the lower court's dismissal of the first amendment claim and affirmed its
dismissal of the antitrust claims.23 The case was remanded to the district
court for resolution of the factual issue of whether the city had violated
PCI's first amendment rights by refusing it access to public facilities. 24
This Note will outline pertinent provisions of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, exploring Congress' mandate for local franchise regula-
tion. It then will examine general first amendment standards established by
the Supreme Court regarding permissible regulation of the media rights of
broadcasters and the printed press. The examination will involve a discus-
sion of the traditional comparative media analysis upon which numerous
lower courts have relied in establishing standards of regulation for the cable
industry. The Note will further explore those justifications for government
regulation that focus on property use rather than on the nature of the me-
dium itself. It then will analyze the court's reasoning in Preferred Commu-
nications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles by first examining the public forum
doctrine and then by determining whether the Preferred court correctly ap-
plied the doctrine. The Note will conclude with an assessment of the impact
of Preferred on the first amendment rights of cable operators.
I. THE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT OF 1984
Historically, cable television has been regulated through local government
franchise processes.25 Typically, municipalities issue franchises to cable op-
erators entitling them to construct and operate a cable television system.2 6
The general pattern has been for franchising authorities to issue only a single
franchise for a given geographic location, even though the regulations usu-
ally do not preclude the issuance of a second franchise in the same area.2 7
Through its enactment of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
22. Id.
23. Id. A dismissal is upheld if it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In conducting the review, the court presumes that all
allegations in the complaint are true, and all doubts are resolved in the plaintiffs favor. Id.
See infra note 162 for discussion of the antitrust claim and the grounds for its dismissal.
24. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1415.
25. See Note, Cable Franchising, supra note 2, at 323-24.
26. Id.
27. A recent survey showed that of the 4200 cities with cable television systems, 99.7%
have only one franchisee. See Noam, Towards an Integrated Communications Market-Over-
coming the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 209, 242 n.148 (1982).
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1984,2" Congress specifically required that cable operators be franchised if
they are to provide service.29 The Cable Act set out a national cable com-
munications policy that was intended to "establish guidelines for . . . Fed-
eral, State, and local authorities with respect to the regulation of cable
systems." 3 The national standards for cable franchising were an attempt to
provide "the cable industry with the stability and certainty that are essential
to its growth and development.""1
Section 621 of the Cable Act authorizes the franchising authority to award
"1 or more franchises within its jurisdiction."3 2 The term "franchising au-
thority" includes "any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or
local law to grant a franchise."33 This provision is designed to permit the
franchising authority to determine the number of cable operators that will
serve its jurisdiction.34 Once a cable company is granted a franchise, it is
authorized to construct a cable system over public rights of way and ease-
ments dedicated for compatible uses.35 The cable operator must pay the
installation and operation cost, ensure the continued safety and appearance
28. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-611
(West Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter cited as Cable Act]. The Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 is contained in title 6 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Communi-
cations Act of 1934 is codified in scattered sections of title 47 of the United States Code.
29. Cable Act, § 621(b)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(b) (West Supp. 1985)). Section
621(b)(2) of the Cable Act permits an operator who is lawfully servicing an area without a
franchise to continue to do so unless the franchising authority requires the operator to acquire
a franchise. Id. § 621(b)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985)).
30. Cable Act, § 601(3) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521(3) (West Supp. 1985)).
31. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4656. The stated purposes of the Act are to:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and
development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsible to
the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with
respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the
widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable opera-
tors against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance and
proposal for future performance meet the standards established by this title; and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary reg-
ulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.
Cable Act, § 601 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West Supp. 1985)).
32. Id. § 621(a)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985)) (emphasis
added).
33. Id. § 602(9) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 522(9) (West Supp. 1985)).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 31, at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4696.
35. Cable Act, § 621(a)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985)).
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of the property being used, and provide just compensation to any property
owner who incurs damages in the course of installation and operation.
3 6
The Cable Act also establishes standards for mandatory commercial use
channels. 37 As a condition of the franchise, the operator must devote a per-
centage of its channel capacity to commercial use by individuals unaffiliated
with the operator.3 ' The operator is prohibited from exercising any editorial
control over the content of broadcasts aired on these channels. 39 This provi-
sion was designed to promote the first amendment goal of fostering "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources." 4 In this respect, the Cable Act reflects the desire expressed in a
number of Supreme Court decisions to promote the first amendment value of
viewpoint diversity.4 '
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS APPLIED TO VARIOUS MEDIA:
IS THE PAST PROLOGUE?
In deriving a first amendment standard for cable television, courts have
struggled to adapt historical first amendment jurisprudence to a new me-
dium. The Supreme Court, although it has not assessed the first amendment
rights of cable operators, repeatedly has considered the problem of applying
broad first amendment principles to various methods of communication.42
In approaching this task, the Court has recognized that "each medium of
expression . . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by stan-
36. Id. § 621(a)(2)(A)-(C) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A § 541(a)(2)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1985)).
37. Id. § 612 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532 (West Supp. 1985)).
38. Id. § 612(b)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985)).
39. Id. § 612(c)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985)). This section
states:
A cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over any video program-
ming provided pursuant to this section, or in any other way consider the content of
such programming, except that an operator may consider such content to the mini-
mum extent necessary to establish a reasonable price for the commercial use of desig-
nated channel capacity by an unaffiliated person.
Id.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 31, at 32, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4669 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
41. See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 ("the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas"); Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20 (The goal of
the first amendment is to promote "the widest possible dissemination of information.").
42. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion) (billboard advertising); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980) (billing envelope inserts); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (picketing in residential
areas); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (drive-in movie theaters); Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (advertising space within city-owned
transit system).
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dards suited to it, for each may present its own problems."43 Different first
amendment standards have been formulated in response to each medium's
unique characteristics.' Consequently, in order to determine the permissi-
ble degree of government regulation, a court must analyze any restraints in
light of the medium's unique attributes.4 5
Confronted with the problem of determining appropriate first amendment
standards for the regulation of cable operations, lower courts have recog-
nized these general guidelines and repeatedly have analogized cable to both
broadcasting and the printed press.46 Courts have analyzed three factors in
their efforts to establish the permissible degree of government regulation
over cable service: physical scarcity,4 7 economic scarcity,4 8 and considera-
tion of cable's interference with the public domain.49 The Supreme Court
previously examined two of these rationales, physical and economic scarcity,
with respect to broadcasting and the printed press.5°
The physical scarcity justification for government regulation applies
where the medium itself inherently limits the number of persons who can
provide service.5 ' The Supreme Court adopted physical scarcity as a justifi-
cation for substantial government control over the broadcast medium be-
cause the available spectrum frequency for transmitting broadcast signals
could not accommodate an infinite or even a large number of broadcasters.5 2
The economic scarcity rationale focuses on whether the medium has natural
monopolistic tendencies thereby making new entries into the industry virtu-
ally impossible. 53 In contrast to its holdings regarding physical scarcity, the
Supreme Court has rejected economic scarcity as a sufficient justification for
mandatory access requirements over the printed press.5 4 The third basis for
43. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
44. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
45. See Goldberg & Couzens, "Peculiar Characteristics": An Analysis of the First Amend-
ment Implications of Broadcasting, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 1 (1978) (evaluating the "peculiar char-
acteristic" rationale as a basis of government regulation of broadcasting).
46. See, e.g., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127-29; Community Communications, 660 F.2d
at 1376; Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1052-57; Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 43-51.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 57-77.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 78-101.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 102-22.
50. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (addressing constitutionality of state's "right
of reply" statute with regard to first amendment rights of the press); Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (addressing first amendment rights of broadcasters); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (same).
51. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
52. See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 226-27.
53. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1973).
54. Compare National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (discussing physical scarcity
1986]
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government regulation, cable's interference with the public domain, arises
from cable's unique characteristics." Numerous courts have maintained
that the disruption caused by cable wiring to public streets and thorough-
fares justifies increased regulation of the industry.56
A. Physical Scarcity Theory as a Justification for Government Regulation
Based on broadcasting's inherent technological limitations,57 the Supreme
Court has upheld the ability of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to license individual broadcasters and to impose certain mandatory
access requirements.5" FCC broadcast licensing was first challenged under
the first amendment in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States. 59 There,
the Supreme Court held that a broadcaster's right to free speech does not
encompass a right to use radio frequencies without a license.6' The Court
reasoned that the technical limitations of the electromagnetic spectrum man-
date government allocation of available channels.6" Writing for the Court,
Justice Frankfurter stated: "With everybody on the air, nobody could be
heard. . . . [T]he radio spectrum is simply not large enough to accommo-
date everybody." 62 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the FCC could
regulate the medium and, as a condition of access, require that broadcasters
serve the interests of the public.6 3
rationale as applied to broadcasting) with Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241 (1973) (discussing eco-
nomic scarcity rationale as applied to the printed press).
55. See, e.g., Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1377-78.
56. Id. Accord Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127-28; Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985.
57. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 226-27 ("Unlike other modes of expression,
radio inherently is not available to all.").
58. See supra note 51.
59. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
60. Id. at 226-27; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389 (observing that "[a broadcast] licen-
see has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license").
61. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 226. This principle has been repeatedly af-
firmed. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101
(1973); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89. A second basis for increased regulation of broadcasting
is the impact theory. Under this theory, increased regulation is justified because of the me-
dium's pervasiveness as evidenced by its substantial impact on the public. See, e.g., Geller &
Lambert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 603, 615-
16 (1983).
The Supreme Court relied in part on the impact theory to justify its decision in Pacifica, 438
U.S. 726 (1978). There, the Court upheld the FCC's power to issue administrative sanctions
against a daytime broadcast of "indecent" language. Id. at 750-51. The Court based its deci-
sion on broadcasting's pervasiveness and the program's accessibility to children. Id. at 748-50.
For a critical view of the impact theory, see, e.g., Geller & Lampert, supra at 615-17; Bazelon,
The First Amendment and the "New Media"-New Directions in Regulating Telecommunica-
tions, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 207-09 (1978).
62. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 212-13.
63. Id. at 218-19; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385-86.
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The Supreme Court elaborated on the scarcity principle in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 4 In Red Lion, the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the FCC fairness doctrine that requires broadcasters to air both sides
of controversial public issues.6 ' The broadcaster unsuccessfully argued that
this doctrine interfered with editorial control of content in violation of the
first amendment.66 The Court rejected this claim, reasoning that scarcity
permitted the government to impose restraints "on licensees in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium." 67 Justice
White, writing for the majority, stated that the goal of the first amendment is
to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.", 6' He therefore
concluded that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
64. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
65. The fairness doctrine requires that broadcasters present controversial public issues
-nd that each side is given fair coverage. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 369. In 1967, the FCC
promulgated rules regulating two aspects of the fairness doctrine dealing with personal attacks
and with political editorializing. Personal Attacks, Political Editorials, 47 C.F.R. § 73.123
(1968).
It is noteworthy, however, that the fairness doctrine increasingly has come under attack.
Critics argue that the doctrine stifles rather than enhances public debate because broadcasters
may choose not to cover controversial issues in order to avoid the mandatory right-to-reply
rule. See, e.g., Bazelon, FCC. Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J.
213, 230 n.58 (1975); Kaufman, Reassessing the Fairness Doctrine, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983
(Magazine), at 16, 18-19.
As a result of criticism, the FCC presently is reconsidering the fairness doctrine and its
chilling effect on broadcasters. Inquiry Into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations on
Broadcast Licensees, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73). The
Supreme Court recently suggested that it would reconsider its Red Lion holding if the FCC
demonstrated that the doctrine restrains rather than enhances free speech. FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3117 n.12 (1984).
66. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395.
67. Id. at 390. Recently, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the spectrum
scarcity rationale has come under increasing criticism. The Court stated:
Critics, including the incumbent Chairman of the FCC, charge that with the advent
of cable and satellite television technology, communities now have access to such a
wide variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine is obsolete. . . .We are not pre-
pared, however, to reconsider our long-standing approach without some signal from
Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that
some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.
League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3116 n.ll (1984).
Numerous scholars have taken the position that technological advances such as cable televi-
sion, low-power television, and direct broadcast satellites undercut the scarcity rationale even
as applied to broadcasters. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982); Kaufman, supra note 65, at 18-19; see also
Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1458-59 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
68. 395 U.S. at 390.
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the broadcasters which is paramount. 69
The only court to approve physical scarcity as a justification for cable
regulation was the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC7 0 Embracing the physical scarcity theory,
the court upheld the FCC's power to regulate community antenna television
systems that retransmit signals received from broadcasting stations.7 1 Sig-
nificantly, however, many courts have rejected the Black Hills Video reason-
ing because of the technological advances of the cable industry since 1968.72
Cable television systems no longer serve solely as passive retransmitters of
broadcast signals, but now originate programming and select which other
stations' broadcasts they will carry.73 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit's
later opinion in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC74 seriously weakened the ac-
ceptance of the physical scarcity rationale in Black Hills Video.
Still, courts have noted that there are some physical limitations imposed
by the number of cables that can be strung from utility poles or buried un-
derground.7" While the need to regulate broadcast frequencies because of
speaker interference is not an applicable concern for cable broadcasting,
courts have recognized another type of scarcity justification7 6 and another
type of interference7 7 that may justify a degree of government regulation of
cable service.
B. The Economic Scarcity Rationale as a Justification
of Government Regulation
Economic scarcity as a justification for government regulation of cable
service has been far more controversial among the courts.7" The economic
scarcity rationale is a product of the cable industry's monopolistic tenden-
cies. Cities have maintained that it is not economically feasible for more
69. Id. See also National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 218-19.
70. 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127 ("frequency interference [is] a problem that
does not arise with cable television"); Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 45 n.80.
73. See, e.g., Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1054-55; see also Note, Cable Franchising, supra
note 2, at 319.
74. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), affd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
75. See, e.g., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 126; Century Fed., 479 F. Supp. at 1563.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 78-101.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 102-22.
78. Compare Home Box Office, 567 F.2d 9 (1977) (rejecting the economic scarcity ration-
ale as a justification for regulating the cable industry), with Community Communications, 660
F.2d 1370 (198 1) (accepting the economic scarcity rationale as a justification for regulating the
cable industry).
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than one cable company to operate in a particular geographic area.7 9 In
response, courts have been forced to decide whether the industry's natural
monopolistic qualities were an adequate justification for the proposed gov-
ernment restraint.
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,8 o the Supreme Court con-
cluded that economic scarcity could not justify regulation of the print media.
In that case, Tornillo brought suit against the newspaper for refusing to
print his replies to editorials critical of his candidacy for state office, basing
his claim on Florida's "right of reply" statute.8 The state relied on the
concentration of the newspaper industry to justify the statute, maintaining
that it was necessary to insure the presentation of all viewpoints where eco-
nomic constraints limited the number of methods of communicating with
the public.82 While agreeing that economic conditions virtually preclude
new entry into the industry, the Court struck down the statute under the
first amendment. It held that economic scarcity was inadequate to override
the first amendment rights of the press.83
Two United States courts of appeal have found that the economic scarcity
rationale is equally inappropriate to justify regulation of cable television.84
In Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reviewed FCC mandatory access and channel capacity re-
quirements applicable to certain cable systems.85 While holding that the
FCC lacked statutory authority to promulgate such requirements, 86 the
Eighth Circuit did express concerns over the first amendment implications of
the FCC action.87
The Midwest Video court concluded that the FCC's mandatory access rule
prevented cable operators from retaining editorial rights and material selec-
79. See Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1374.
80. 418 U.S. 241 (1973).
81. Id. at 244.
82. Id. at 249-51.
83. Id. at 258.
84. See Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1055-56; Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46; see also
Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1450-51. But see Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985.
85. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1032 (8th Cir. 1978), affd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The court here reviewed the FCC's 1976 Report that had al-
tered the 1972 mandatory access rules in three major ways: it eliminated the top 100 market
criteria thereby applying them to all cable systems with more than 3499 subscribers; it ex-
tended the compliance deadline for the 20-channel construction requirement to June 21, 1986,
for most, but not all of the existing systems; and it required four access channels of large
systems and required other systems to conglomerate access on one or more channels. Id. at
1033-34.
86. Id. at 1035.
87. Id. at 1052-57.
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tion decisions over the four required public access channels."8 In rejecting
the government's power to compel public access, the court compared cable-
casting to newspapers. It referred to cable operators as the creators of a
"private electronic 'publication'" and criticized the Commission for ignor-
ing the Supreme Court's holding in Miami Herald.89 The court indicated
that the rights of the public to engage in free speech should have been bal-
anced against freedom of the press.9" The court maintained that the Com-
mission had improperly disregarded the latter consideration. 91
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,92 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit also compared cable television to the
printed press. 93 The court refused to accept the cable industry's natural mo-
nopolistic tendencies as a justification for government regulation.94 It ac-
knowledged that within the industry, the pattern has been for only one
company to serve a given area, thus producing a noncompetitive monopolis-
tic industry.95 Aside from these economic concerns, the court did not find
that any physical or electrical interference would limit the number of poten-
tial operators in a given locality.9 6 Based on these findings, the court stated
that "there is nothing in the record before us to suggest a constitutional
distinction between cable television and newspapers on this point." 97
Several courts, however, have held that economic scarcity will justify reg-
ulation of cable operations, finding that cable television and newspapers are
constitutionally distinguishable.9" These courts noted that the printed press,
unlike cable television systems, had been virtually free from government reg-
ulation of its operations and content.99 More importantly, these courts also
found government franchising to be essential because the installation of
cable systems interfered with the use of public streets and other municipal
88. Id. at 1055-56.
89. Id. at 1056. See generally Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC,
The First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 133 (1976).
90. Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1053.
91. Id.
92. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
93. Id. at 46.
94. Id.
95. Id. But cf Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d 1434 at 1450 (stating that "the tendency toward
monopoly, if present at all, may be attributable more to governmental action-particularly the
municipal franchise process-than to any 'natural' economic phenomenon").
96. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127-28; Community Communications. 660 F.2d
at 1378-79; Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985; Hopkinsville Cable TV 562 F. Supp. at 547.
99. Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1379; Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985.
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facilities,"o and thus provided the local municipality with a legitimate inter-
est in limiting access to these facilities.'o'
III. DISRUPTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,'02 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized the disruption of
the public domain caused by cable operations as a type of interference justi-
fying government regulation. 0 3 The Tenth Circuit moved beyond a com-
parative media analysis by focusing on the property in question. To
determine the permissible extent of regulation, the court looked to the nature
of the public property to which access was being sought and to the interfer-
ence resulting from access to that property.
The issue in Community Communications was whether the city's geo-
graphic districting plan violated the first amendment rights of cable opera-
tors." The case arose following the issuance of a preliminary injunction
against the City of Boulder10 5 preventing Community Communications
Company (CCC) from expanding its cable television services into the city.'06
Overruling the district court, the Tenth Circuit examined the degree of gov-
ernment regulation over cable operators permitted by the first amend-
ment.'0 7 The court offered two justifications for the city's regulations:
cable's disruption of municipal resources"0 ' and economic scarcity. °9
The court first noted that for cable operators to disseminate information,
100. Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127; Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1378-79;
Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985.
101. Omega Satellite, 694 F.2d at 127; Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1378;
Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 985.
102. 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
103. Id. at 1377-78.
104. Id. at 1373. In 1966, Boulder granted the plaintiff a 20-year revocable license, permit-
ting the company to provide cable services to all residents of Boulder. Community Communi-
cations Co. (CCC) chose to serve only one area of Boulder until 1979 when it informed the city
of its expansion plans. The city had also received a request from another company for a per-
mit. Boulder conducted a study of the industry's technology and concluded that cable systems
were natural monopolies. As a result of the study's findings, the city placed a moratorium on
CCC's expansion efforts. This provided other companies the opportunity to bid on service to
the other areas before CCC could monopolize the cable industry in Boulder. Shortly after-
ward, CCC filed a complaint against the city alleging its actions violated the Sherman Act and
the first amendment. Id.
105. Id. at 1372.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1375-80.
108. Id. at 1377-78.
109. Id. at 1378-79.
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they must interfere with municipal facilities by stringing cable across poles
or through underground conduits.11° In this respect, the court distinguished
cable broadcasting from the printed press, which reaches its intended aud-
ience without any disruptive effect on public property."' Focusing on
cable's disruptive effect on the public domain, the court concluded that cable
broadcasters, in order to engage in first amendment activities, must necessar-
ily obtain a license." t2 It reasoned that governmental interference with a
cable operator's first amendment rights is justified to limit public inconven-
ience and to promote public safety." 3
The second justification advanced by the court for cable broadcasting reg-
ulation was economic scarcity." 4 The court distinguished cable broadcast-
ing from the print medium in two ways. First, it noted that the press has
traditionally been free from governmental control, whereas cable operators
historically have been subject to various governmental restrictions.' Rely-
ing on its earlier observations concerning the dissimilar effects of the two
media on public property,' 16 the Tenth Circuit indicated that the economic
scarcity rationale applies at the point where the municipality must grant or
deny a request for a license.' 17 Responding to the natural monopolistic ten-
dencies of the industry, the court maintained that the government must have
some authority to assure, in the public interest, that "optimum use" is made
of the cable medium." 8 Interestingly, the court in Community Communica-
tions also suggested that the city's districting ordinance might be a justifiable
means to avoid "an outmoded or less than state-of-the-art cable communica-
tions system." ' 19
Because of cable's interference with public property and economic scar-
city, the court concluded there was a greater need for government regulation
over the cable industry than there was for regulation of the printed press.' 20
This conclusion begged the question of the constitutionally permissible de-
110. Id. at 1377.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1377-78.
113. Id. at 1378.
114. This argument was advanced by the City and rejected by the lower court. Id. at 1378-
79.
115. Id. at 1379. See also Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 976 (distinguishing cable from news-
papers because the print media historically has been free from governmental control over
content).
116. Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1379.
117. Id. ("[The city] must be permitted to deal with the effects of the scarcity that may
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gree of regulation. The court maintained that while the general rationale for
allowing government regulation may be the same for cable as for broadcast-
ing, the criteria upon which licensing decisions are based may be different for
the two industries.' 2 ' Community Communications suggested three factors
that may justify differences in the regulations applied to the cable medium:
first, the degree of the medium's natural monopolistic tendencies; second,
the potential for technological developments; and finally, the possible uses of
cable as a form of two-way communication.' 22
IV. THE TREATMENT OF CABLE REGULATIONS AS AN INCIDENTAL
BURDEN ON SPEECH
In Home Box Office, 123 the court reviewed FCC regulations that limited
the types of programming that cablecasters and subscription broadcast tele-
vision stations could offer their customers. 124 Although the case was de-
121. Id. In identifying these criteria, the court cautioned that "the power to regulate is not
one whit broader than the need that evokes it." Id. These criteria were to guide a more
detailed inquiry by the district court into cable broadcasting's unique attributes based on a
more fully developed factual record. Id. at 1380. The court of appeals concluded that the first
amendment issues raised a presumption of irreparable harm for both the city and CCC. Id.
The court, therefore, denied the district court's one-sided grant of preliminary injunctive relief
to CCC and instead froze both parties in their present circumstances until a trial on the merits
was conducted. Id.
122. Id. The court in Omega Satellite also addressed the permissible criteria for the city's
franchising process. 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982). It found that the city could regulate cable
broadcasting to a greater degree than other nonbroadcast media. Id. at 127. The court based
its decision on three factors: cable's interference with other potential users of the poles and
conduits, its natural monopolistic tendencies, and its pervasiveness which triggers the need to
protect children. Id. at 127-28.
With regard to the criteria upon which the city chooses an operator, the court conceded that
the city may not have unfettered control over the criteria. Id. at 128. The court in Omega
Satellite, however, observed that vague criteria for awarding a cable franchise may be constitu-
tionally permissible because requiring specific criteria may be impractical. Id. The court fur-
ther noted that the city's "cumbersome" and vague standards may be "the best possible-or at
least a constitutionally adequate-accommodation between regulatory feasibility and the pol-
icy of the First Amendment." Id. at 128-29.
123. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). Those aspects of Home Box
Office dealing with the economic scarcity rationale are discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 92-97.
124. Id. at 49. The Commission feared pay cable television would have adverse affects on
conventional broadcasting by "siphoning" its programs. Siphoning occurs when a program
aired on free television is purchased by a subscription cable channel. The Commission argued
that the program purchased by the cable company no longer would be available to television
networks or that its showing would be delayed. In either event, the Commission argued this
phenomenon would prevent or delay viewing access to a segment of the American public. Id.
at 24-25.
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cided on statutory grounds, 21 the court also discussed the constitutional
propriety of the FCC pay cable rules. In evaluating the first amendment
issues, the court rejected both the physical and economic scarcity rationales
for government regulation.' 26  The court, acknowledging that the first
amendment permits the regulation of "collateral aspects" of speech,' 27
treated the FCC regulations as an incidental burden on the cable operator's
free speech rights. 12 ' The Home Box Office court concluded that the regula-
tions affected "a government interest . . . unrelated to the suppression of
free expression"1 29 stating that the proper test for the constitutionality of
such regulations was outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien. 130
In that case, O'Brien had argued that the burning of his draft card was
symbolic speech protected by the first amendment.3 The Supreme Court
rejected the contention that all conduct is speech merely because the person
engaging in that conduct intends to express an idea.' 3 2 The O'Brien Court
held that where conduct contains both speech and nonspeech elements, inci-
dental restrictions on first amendment freedoms are tolerated if there is "a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment."' 33 The Court outlined a four-prong test to determine whether a gov-
ernment regulation is constitutionally permissible. '"' First, the government
must have the constitutional power to promulgate the regulation; second,
the regulation must further a substantial governmental interest; third, the
interest which is being advanced must be "unrelated to the suppression of
free expression"; and fourth, the regulation incidentally limiting activities
within the scope of first amendment protection must be the least restrictive
125. The court held that the FCC lacked authority to promulgate the pay cable rules. Id.
at 43-51.
126. Id. at 43-46.
127. Id. at 47. See generally Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1965).
128. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 47.
129. Id. at 48 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
130. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
131. Id. at 376.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 377. The four-part O'Brien test, in full, is as follows:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial government inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
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means of furthering that interest. 135
In Home Box Office, a court for the first time applied the O'Brien test to
determine whether government regulation of cable television was constitu-
tionally permissible.' 36 Under the analysis in Home Box Office, a regulation
is constitutionally valid if it "further[s] an important or substantial govern-
mental interest" and "if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedoms is no greater than is essential for the furtherance of that
interest."' 37 In applying this test, the court in Home Box Office concluded
that although the FCC regulations were content neutral, they did not satisfy
the second prong of the O'Brien test. 138 The court held that the FCC had
"not put itself in a position to know" whether its concerns about cable televi-
sion's effect on local broadcasting were "real or merely ... fanciful."'
139
The Commission's "speculation and innuendo" failed to offer convincing
proof of an existing problem and therefore did not demonstrate "an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest.""
In Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, '1' the federal district
court also applied the O'Brien test to determine whether cable regulations
were constitutionally permissible. In Berkshire, the cable company filed an
application to operate a cable television system in Newport County, Rhode
Island. '42 Rhode Island regulations would have required Berkshire Cablevi-
sion to provide public, educational, and governmental channels.' 43 Berk-
shire filed suit against Rhode Island claiming that the mandatory access
requirements violated the first amendment rights of cable operators because
the rules stripped them of control over their channels.'" Refusing to equate
cable and the print media, the Berkshire court accepted the economic scar-
city rationale as a sufficient justification for the regulation of cable
television. '45
The Berkshire court reasoned that the cable franchising process produced
a natural monopoly making it unlikely that a second cable company could
135. Id. For a discussion of the O'Brien test, see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482, 1483-90 (1975).
136. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 47-49.
137. Id. at 48 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
138. Id. at 49-50.
139. Id. at 50.
140. Id.
141. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
142. Id. at 978.
143. Id. at 979.
144. Id. at 979-80. Additionally, Berkshire claimed that the regulations deprived it of its
property, thereby violating the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 980.
145. Id. at 986.
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build and operate a successful cable system in an area already being ser-
viced.14 6 While acknowledging that the Supreme Court had rejected the
economic scarcity rationale as a justification for mandatory access require-
ments imposed on newspapers, the court nonetheless claimed that signifi-
cantly different effects resulted from denying public access to the respective
media.'4 7 It noted that a person who is denied access to the printed press is
not effectively barred from expressing his views in that same print media
because there are relatively inexpensive alternative ways to convey a printed
message.' 4 ' The court contrasted this situation to that where one is barred
access to a cable station because he lacks any economically feasible alterna-
tive method of conveying his message within that same medium.' 4 9 The
court concluded that "scarcity is scarcity-its particular source, whether
'physical' or 'economic,' does not matter if its effect is to remove from all but
a small group an important means of expressing ideas."1 50 Accordingly, the
district court in Berkshire recognized that the goal of the scarcity rationale,
previously applied to the broadcast media in Red Lion, was the appropriate
model for cable television.' 5 '
After establishing that the government may regulate cable operators' edi-
torial control over their channels, the court then addressed whether the
Rhode Island regulations were the least restrictive means of furthering the
government's interest in allocating a scarce resource. Having determined
that the Rhode Island access rules were content-neutral and only inciden-
tally restricted the first amendment rights of cable operators, the district
court applied the same O'Brien test that was used in Home Box Office. 52 It
concluded that the rules served substantial governmental interests by ensur-
ing community participation in cable television programming.' 3 The court
noted that the rules furthered first amendment values of promoting the
146. Id.
147. Id. at 984-85.
148. Id. at 986 (noting that a person could distribute "a leaflet, pamphlet, or other rela-
tively inexpensive form of 'publication' ").
149. Id. But cf Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 256-58; Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 48. Both
courts observed that although not everyone can speak through a given medium because an
individual cannot afford to do so, this does not justify government intervention. Id.
A potential problem with this argument is that the Berkshire court emphasized the available
alternatives within the same medium yet ignored the realistic ineffectiveness of the alternative
it proposed.
150. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 986-87.
151. Id. at 986. The goal stated by the court was "to promote the First Amendment by
making a powerful communications medium available to as many. . . citizens as is reasonably
possible." Id. (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 987-88. With regard to the O'Brien test used in Home Box Office, see supra text
accompanying note 137.
153. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 987.
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66 'unfettered flow of information'" and a well-informed public by opening
up cable television to all.' 5 4 Ultimately, the Berkshire court found that the
rules imposed no excessive restraint because cable operators were required to
turn over only seven of their fifty channels and retained complete control
over those remaining. 155
By relying on the O'Brien test, Berkshire and Home Box Office exposed
the insufficiency of the comparative media analysis as a means of determin-
ing the appropriate limits of governmental regulation of cable television. In
a similar fashion, Community Communications highlighted the inadequacy
of the comparative media analysis by focusing on the uniqueness of the cable
medium. Not surprisingly, Preferred also moved away from the comparative
media analysis by augmenting its holding with the application of the public
forum doctrine.
V. THE PREFERRED ANALYSIS
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,'5 6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a city's
policies of auctioning the right to provide cable service to a particular area
and of limiting each area to a single franchise was an infringement of the first
amendment rights of a cable operator. PCI approached two Los Angeles
utilities in an attempt to lease space on their poles and conduits.15 7 Both
utilities informed PCI that it must obtain a cable television franchise from
the city before such an agreement could be concluded.' 5 ' PCI petitioned the
city for a franchise and was refused because it had failed to participate in the
auction process.159 Subsequently, PCI brought suit against the city basing
its claim on the first amendment and federal antitrust laws.' 6 ° The district
court dismissed the complaint and PCI appealed. 16 ' The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the antitrust claims but reversed its
dismissal of the first amendment claim.
162
154. Id. (quoting CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 19 (1974)).
155. Id. at 988.
156. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
157. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1400.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1401.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1399. See supra note 23.
162. 754 F.2d at 1399. The court dismissed the antitrust claim based on the municipality's
immunity from antitrust liability. Id. at 1415. Under the Sherman Act, states are immune
from liability. Id. at 1415 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)). Municipalities,
however, are not automatically immune from liability. The court answered two questions in
evaluating the city's immunity. The first was whether the city acted in response to a "clearly
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Preferred was the first decision to hold cable licensing regulations uncon-
stitutional.'6 3 The court's analysis appropriately may be divided into two
distinct first amendment approaches. First, the court examined cable's first
amendment rights, as earlier courts had done, by focusing on the medium
being regulated. 64 Under this approach, the court distinguished govern-
ment regulation of broadcasting from government regulation of cable.' 65
The court concluded that the physical and economic scarcity rationales were
insufficient to justify the franchising process at issue.
166
Moving away from the traditional media analysis, the court then evalu-
ated both the type of property to which access was being sought 167 and
whether the intended use was destructive to that property. 68 While conced-
ing that some degree of regulation over the use of public facilities would be
permissible, the court concluded that restricting access to only one company
might overstep the bounds of permissible regulation if it could not be shown
that the facilities would support only one system. 169 Further, the court fo-
cused solely on the property in question, employing the public forum doc-
trine,' 70 to reinforce its conclusion that the limitations imposed by the city
were potentially unconstitutional. 
17
A. Preferred's Rejection of the Physical and Economic Scarcity Rationales
In Preferred, the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected earlier judicial attempts to
apply broadcasting standards to the cable industry. 172 The court observed
that the similarities between the two media were "superficial," concluding
articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy that displaced competition with regula-
tion. Id. at 1412. The court in Preferred held that the city's authority to issue franchises under
§ 53066 of the California Code constituted a "'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed'
state policy to displace competition with regulation." Id. at 1415 (quoting City of Lafayette v.
Lousiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
The second question the court briefly explored was the effect of its first amendment holding
on the antitrust claim. Id. at 1412. The court rejected PCI's contention that because the
franchising process violated the first amendment it necessarily should prevail on its antitrust
claim as well. Id. at 1415. The court reasoned that the antitrust laws and the first amendment
serve distinct purposes and are neither related nor dependent claims. Id.
163. Id. at 1396.
164. Id. at 1403-07.
165. Id. at 1403-04.
166. Id. at 1404-05. For a critique of the comparative media analysis approach, see Lively,
Fear and the Media: A First Amendment Horrow Show, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1091-95
(1985).
167. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405-07.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1407-09.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1403.
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that the differences between cable and over-the-air broadcasting mandate
dissimilar first amendment standards.' 73 The court rejected the city's con-
tention that because pole and conduit space are to some "undetermined ex-
tent physically limited," it should be permitted to limit access to only one
cable operator.' 74 At the same time, however, the court did not rule out the
possibility that physical scarcity might justify increased cable regulation
where the structures are physically incapable of accommodating all those
who seek access.' 75 Thus, the Preferred court concluded that, based on
PCI's allegations of available space on poles and in conduits, the city could
not justify its denial by relying on the physical scarcity rationale unless it
demonstrated that the required space could not be made available.
176
With regard to the city's argument that economic scarcity justified the
regulations, the court accepted PCI's allegation that competition is a viable
possibility in the Los Angeles cable market. 177 Although the court assumed
that no natural monopoly existed, it rejected the Tenth Circuit's rationale in
Community Communications. 17' The Tenth Circuit had distinguished cable
trom the print media by showing that cable's economic scarcity was accom-
panied by the disruptive use of public property, justifying the need for a
government licensing process. 179 In Preferred, the court dismissed this rea-
soning as overly broad.'80 It refused to transform the need for a licensing
process into a justification for creating a monopoly through the use of the
city's auction process.''
B. The O'Brien Test as Applied in Preferred
The court in Preferred recognized the city's legitimate interest in minimiz-
ing the disruption of the public domain.' 82 The court further conceded that
such an interest may require government regulation of a noncommunicative
aspect of speech.' 8 3 In assessing the reasonableness of a regulation aimed at
the medium's noncommunicative aspects, the court relied on the O'Brien
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1404.
175. The court stated: "We express no opinion on the issue of the manner in which the
City should allocate access to poles and conduits to competing cable systems when these struc-
tures are incapable of accommodating all those seeking access." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1405.
179. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 114-19.
180. 754 F.2d at 1405.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1406.
183. Id. at 1405.
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test. ' 8 4
Preferred established that the city had legitimate interests in minimizing
interference with the public domain.' 85 Furthermore, the court conceded
that this interest was " 'unrelated to the suppression of free expression.' "186
Nevertheless, the court held that the city failed to meet the fourth prong of
the O'Brien test because there were less restrictive means available to protect
the city's interest.18 7 The means that the city adopted to effectuate its inter-
est allowed only one cable company to operate a franchise.'88 The court
reasoned that such a system created an unnecessary risk that city officials
would discriminate in their choice of cable operators based on the content or
views in their proposed programs. 89 Preferred held that this risk could be
substantially lessened by means less restrictive of the first amendment rights
of cable operators.' 9
The court in Preferred distinguished between regulating the use of public
property and effectively restricting the access of cable operators to the mar-
ket.' 9 It balanced the city's interest in minimizing disruption of the public
domain against the risk that the auction system would restrict the editorial
judgments of cable operators.' 9 2 The court found that the negative impact
of the regulations on the editorial judgment of the cable operators out-
weighed the city's interest. 1
93
C. The Appropriateness of the O'Brien Test: Do the Facts Support the
Application of the Test?
The court in Preferred introduced the O'Brien test by citing the Supreme
Court's language in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego. "' In Me-
184. Id. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
185. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1406. The court also recognized the city's legitimate interests
in public safety and in the maintainance of public thoroughfares. Id.
186. Id. at 1405 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
187. Id. at 1406. The court stated:
It has not been alleged that public utility facilities owned or controlled by the City
can only support the use of a single or a few cables. Indeed, PCI has alleged pre-
cisely the contrary. A different and more sharply focused response by the City could
protect the legitimate interests of the City and its citizens.
Id.






192. Id. at 1406-07.
193. Id.
194. 453 U.S. 490 (1981); see Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1405.
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tromedia, the Supreme Court recognized a legitimate government interest in
controlling the noncommunicative aspects of speech.' 95 Yet it cannot be
said that Metromedia offers any support of the Preferred court's reliance on
O'Brien. In Metromedia, the Court did not apply the O'Brien test. Rather,
it held that a balancing test was required where regulation of a noncom-
municative aspect of speech infringed on the communicative aspects. 196 The
Court concluded that "the First Amendment interest at stake" must be
weighed against "the public interest allegedly served by the regulation."
1 97
Assessing these interests required a "particularized inquiry into the nature of
the conflicting interests at stake."' 98 Preferred, without referring to the Me-
tromedia inquiry, performed a cursory balancing test under the fourth part
of its O'Brien analysis.' 99
Another issue raised by Preferred's application of the O'Brien test is
whether a noncommunicative aspect of speech was, in fact, present. In
O'Brien, the Court stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 2" The Supreme Court in
O'Brien focused on the plaintiff's conduct in an effort to determine whether
burning his draft card could be labeled "speech."" '' The Court concluded
the "speech" and "nonspeech" elements involved there were combined and,
accordingly, enunciated and applied its four-prong test.2"2
The difficulty in Preferred lies in identifying the "nonspeech" or "noncom-
municative" conduct of the cable operator. While not specifically identify-
ing this conduct, the court suggested that the disruption of the public
domain caused by cable wiring is the noncommunicative aspect being regu-
lated.20 3 The question that remains, however, is whether this disruption is
due to a cable operator's noncommunicative conduct or whether it is simply
195. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 502. As the Court stated, "the government has legitimate
interests in controlling the noncommunicative aspects of the medium, . . . but the First and
Fourteenth Amendments foreclose a similar interest in controlling the communicative as-
pects." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Linmark Ass'n v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977) (quoting Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975))).
198. Id. at 503.
199. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1406-07.
200. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
201. Id. at 376-77. See also Ely, supra note 135, at 1494-95 (discussing the speech/non-
speech distinction).
202. Id. at 377-82.
203. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1406.
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the inevitable effect of the operator's attempt to engage in protected first
amendment activities.
D. Preferred's Application of the Public Forum Doctrine
The Supreme Court developed the public forum doctrine in response to
the recurring problem of determining when the first amendment gives an
individual or group access to government property to engage in expressive
activity.2" The public forum doctrine thus is employed to determine
whether access will be granted to those who seek use of government property
for free speech activities."' In applying the public forum analysis, courts
balance the government's interest in maintaining the property for its in-
tended use against the first amendment rights of those who wish to use the
property.20 6
Specifically, the Supreme Court has identified three categories of govern-
ment-owned property: public forums, limited public forums, and nonpublic
forums. 20 7 The particular forum determines the extent to which the govern-
ment can control access to the property. Traditional public forums are
"places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
,208 0assembly and debate, '  such as streets and parks.20 9 In these places, the
government may enforce content-based regulations only when such restric-
tions are necessary to serve compelling state interests and are narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.210
The second category is the limited public forum where the government
designates property for use by the public for the exercise of first amendment
rights. 2 1' While the government is not required to establish such a forum,
during the time that it does, the same standards applicable to streets and
204. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439
(1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). For a
critical evaluation of the public forum analysis, see Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature
of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1219 (1984).
205. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
206. See, e.g., Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3448.
207. See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (summarizing the three categories
of government-owned property).
208. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
209. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
210. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. Also, content neutral regulations may be enforced
if they are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative means of communication." Id.
211. Id. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (school classrooms opened for
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parks apply.2 12 The third type of forum is government property that is not
open to the public for use as a forum for speech either by tradition or by
designation.2 13 Restrictions pertaining to nonpublic forums are permissible
as long as they are "reasonable" and viewpoint neutral.2 14
The court in Preferred found that public utility poles and underground
conduits are not traditional public forums,2 15 and thus followed the Supreme
Court's holding in Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers
for Vincent.2 16 In Vincent, the Court upheld, against a first amendment
challenge, a city ordinance prohibiting sign posting on public utility poles
and other public property.2 t ' The Court reasoned that a city's "esthetic in-
terest" in eliminating "visual blight" is a sufficient interest to prohibit the
temporary use of its utility poles for posting political campaign signs. 2 8 The
Court applied the O'Brien test, identifying that test as the "appropriate
framework for reviewing a viewpoint neutral regulation of this kind." '2 19
The Court found that it was within the city's constitutional power to ad-
vance esthetic values and that this interest was unrelated to the suppression
of ideas. 22' The Court also concluded that the city's interest in avoiding
visual clutter was substantial enough to justify the ordinance's effect on the
taxpayers' expression. 22 Affirming the majority holding in Metromedia, the
Vincent Court concluded that sign posting on public property "constitutes a
significant substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit.,
222
After finding the ordinance valid under the O'Brien test, the Court ad-
use by student groups); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (munic-
ipal theaters).
212. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
213. Id. (intra-school mailboxes); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1981) (military
bases).
214. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. The Court found that "[iln addition to time, place,
and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communi-
cative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id.
215. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1408.
216. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
217. Id. at 2124-36. In support of Roland Vincent, a candidate for the Los Angeles City
Council, a group of his supporters attached campaign signs to utility poles. As required by the
city's Municipal Code, these signs were removed from the poles. Id. at 2122-23.
218. Id. at 2128-30. The Court stated, "[t]he problem addressed by this ordinance-the
visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles . . . -constitutes a significant substantive evil
within the City's power to prohibit." Id. at 2130 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 2129.
220. Id. at 2129-32.
221. Id. at 2130-32.
222. Id. at 2130. Cf Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he city's interest in ... the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded
high respect.").
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dressed the taxpayers' argument that because utility poles are located on
streets and thoroughfares, the poles should be treated as a public forum.223
The Vincent court concluded that telephone poles and lampposts were
neither traditional nor limited public forums.224 Instead, it found the prop-
erty to be a nonpublic forum.225 Based upon the nonpublic forum test, the
Court concluded that the ordinance passed constitutional scrutiny because it
served a legitimate interest, was viewpoint neutral, and alternative channels
of communication were available.2 26 The Court found the taxpayers' reli-
ance on the public forum doctrine to be "misplaced. ' 227 Although the
Court addressed the public forum issue, it questioned whether the public
forum doctrine was the appropriate analytical tool for the case.228 In a foot-
note, the Vincent court stated that it is "of limited utility in the context of
this case to focus on whether the tangible property itself should be deemed a
public forum.
229
In Preferred, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Vincent on several
grounds.23' The court observed that stringing or laying cables, unlike sign
posting, is basically compatible with the normal use of the city's poles.23
Because the poles are a forum for cable conduit space, the poles may still
serve as a "forum for expression via the cable medium" despite the fact that
they are not a traditional public forum.232 Thus, the court held that the
facilities in question could be considered either a limited or a nonpublic fo-
rum."' Preferred noted three facts that supported PCI's contention that the
poles were limited public forums. First, California had statutorily dedicated
"surplus space" on its utility facilities for cable companies' use.234 Second,
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power "ha[d] held itself out to
cable companies as a provider of pole-attachment services." '235 Third, the
court observed that the existence of the city's franchising process indicated
its desire to permit at least some access to these facilities.236
These three factors substantiated PCI's claim that the utility structures
223. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
224. Id. at 2134.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2134.
228. Id. at 2134 n.32.
229. Id.
230. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1408.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1409.
234. Id. See CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 767.5(b) (West Supp. 1984).
235. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1409.
236. Id.
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were limited public forums.23 7 Treating these facilities as limited public fo-
rums, the court concluded that the City's licensing process was not a reason-
able time, place, and manner regulation.238 Preferred found that both the
city's solicitation of "bids" from prospective operators and its denial of ac-
cess to all except the "highest 'bidder' " were an unconstitutional exercise of
the city's licensing authority.239
The court in Preferred found that even if the public facilities at issue were
nonpublic forums, the city's auctioning process was still constitutionally im-
permissible. 2" For regulations of a nonpublic forum to be constitutional,
they must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable.241 The Preferred court de-
clared that the city's current practice was not viewpoint neutral.242 The
court distinguished the city's practice of awarding a single franchise from an
outright ban on the grounds that a ban, as in Vincent, is viewpoint neu-
tral.243 It found that the city's attempt to award only one cable company a
franchise "create[d] an impermissible risk of covert discrimination based on
the content of the views expressed in the operator's proposed program-
ming.",244 In distinguishing Vincent, the Court maintained that the city
could not grant one speaker access to the property and forbid access to all
others.245
E. Preferred's Public Forum Analysis in Light of Cornelius
In determining whether the cable attachments to a telephone pole consti-
tute a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum, it is necessary to examine
Preferred in light of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.24 6 In Cornelius, the Court
addressed whether the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) violated the first
amendment rights of legal defense and political advocacy groups that were
excluded from participating in the fundraising activities.
247
237. "PCI's complaint sufficiently alleges that the utility facilities at issue do constitute a
kind of public forum, either by tradition or by designation." Id. (emphasis in the original).
238. Id. at 1409.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3451-54 (1985).
242. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1409.
243. Id.
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
247. Id. at 3446. CFC is an annual fundraising drive among federal employees conducted
during working hours at the federal workplace. Id. at 3443. Participating organizations sub-
mit 30-word statements included in the campaign literature which then is distributed to federal
employees. The only organizations permitted to participate in the CFC were tax-exempt, non-
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Applying the public forum doctrine, the Supreme Court in Cornelius be-
gan its analysis by defining the relevant forum.24 The Court stated that in
defining the forum, the correct analysis extended beyond simply identifying
the government property at issue. 249 Instead, the Court observed that the
access sought by the speaker was the more appropriate focal point.25° Ac-
cordingly, the relevant forum in Cornelius was the CFC and not the federal
workplace. 25' As applied to Preferred, the property at issue was the poles
and conduit space, and the cable operator sought access to the place on these
facilities where the cable wires attach.
In Cornelius, after identifying the forum, the Court concentrated on
whether the forum was public or nonpublic.252 In determining if the prop-
erty was a public forum, the Cornelius Court looked to both the intent of the
government and the nature of the property.25 3 Intent, Cornelius held, con-
sists of the government's policy and practice in regard to the property at
issue. 1 4 With regard to the nature of the property, the Court focused on
whether the property lent itself to use for expressive activity.255 Cornelius
concluded that the government did not intend to open up the CFC to all tax-
exempt organizations and that it therefore was not a public forum.256
Applying the Cornelius analysis to the facts in Preferred, the city's prac-
tice and policy did not evidence an intent to designate its facilities as a public
forum open to all cable companies seeking access.2 57 Los Angeles always
profit charitable organizations that were both supported by public contributions and provided
direct health and welfare services. The legal defense and political advocacy organizations that
challenged the regulations were specifically excluded. Id. at 3443-44. See generally Note, Fo-
rum over Substance: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 35 CATH. U.L.
REV. 307 (1986).
248. 105 S. Ct. at 3448. The Court first recognized that charitable solicitation of funds is a
form of protected speech and, therefore, implicates first amendment interests. Id. at 3447. See
also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (establishing
that soliciting funds is an interest protected by the first amendment).
249. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3449.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 3449-50.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 3450-51. In determining that the CFC was a nonpublic forum, the Court con-
cluded that "[tihe Government did not create the CFC for purposes of providing a forum for
expressive activity." Id. at 3451.
256. Id.
257. See Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1402 (city argues that it may limit access to one cable
company); Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3450. Here, the Supreme Court discussed Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The Court noted as significant, the city's intent to
limit access to advertising spaces on municipal buses. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3450 (emphasis
added).
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had limited pole access to one franchise and the relevant state statute permit-
ted this limitation.2"' The disruption to the public domain that results from
allowing additional companies access to poles further supports the conclu-
sion that the city did not intend to designate the facilities as a public forum
and significantly undercuts PCI's argument that the facilities were limited
public forums.2" 9
The Preferred court noted that even if the poles and conduits were appro-
priately characterized as a nonpublic forum, the city's auction process would
still be unconstitutional under the applicable test.2 6° With regard to non-
public forums, Cornelius held that a regulation must be viewpoint neutral,
there must be reasonable alternative means available for communication,
and the regulation must be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose.2 6'
Preferred maintained that the city's practice was not viewpoint neutral
262
because it "create[d] an impermissible risk of covert discrimination based on
the content or the views expressed in the operator's proposed program-
ming. ' 26' The legitimacy of this argument, after Cornelius, turns on
whether the Supreme Court would accept the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the risk of discrimination arising from the city's single franchise system
warrants the finding of viewpoint nonneutrality.
The second prong of the Cornelius nonpublic forum analysis states that
there must be reasonable alternative means for a cable operator to reach its
intended audience. In Preferred, Los Angeles argued that PCI could use
another company's wiring to transmit its programming.2 While the Pre-
ferred court found this alternative inadequate to protect PCI's ability to ex-
ercise expressive rights, it seems to be an alternative means sufficient to meet
the Cornelius test.265 As the Court stated in Cornelius: "[t]he Government's
decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it
258. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1400-01; see also Cable Act, § 621(a)(1) (codified at 47
U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985)) ("A franchising authority may award, in accordance
with the provisions of this [subchapter], one or more franchises within its jurisdiction.").
259. The Court in Cornelius referred to its earlier decision in Lehman, 418 U.S. 298 (1974),
where it determined that the city intended to limit advertising spaces on municipal transit
buses and had done so for 26 years. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3450 (quoting Lehman, 418 U.S.
298 (1974)). An additional factor in Lehman was that the property was being used as commer-
cial enterprise. Cornelius, however, did not distinguish the case on this point.
260. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1409.
261. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451-54.
262. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1409.
263. Id. (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 1409-10.
265. See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3453. The Court stated, "[t]he First Amendment does not
demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum merely because use of that forum may be the
most efficient means of delivering the speaker's message." Id.
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation. 2 66
The third prong of the Cornelius analysis of nonpublic forums examines
whether the regulation is reasonable in light of the forum's purpose. PCI
could strongly argue that since the poles are able to handle more cable at-
tachments, limiting access to only one operator is unreasonable, especially in
light of the first amendment values that such a practice undermines. The
first amendment seeks to foster an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas."
2 67
PCI might argue that the private marketplace, rather than the city, should
control the success or failure of a cable company. By allowing more than
one company to serve a given area, the additional space on the poles permits
such a shift in control to occur.
F Preferred's Holding in Light of the Cable Communications Policy Act
Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 to imple-
ment a uniform regulatory scheme for cable television.268 The Act empow-
turs local authorities to "award . . 1 or more franchises within its
jurisdiction. ' 269 The Act's franchising model is similar to the Los Angeles
franchising procedure. 270 Despite this fact, the court in Preferred relegated
its discussion of the Act to a footnote,271' acknowledging a municipality's
interest in "regulating disruption of public resources through a system of
permits or franchises., 27 2 Yet Preferred directly attacked the Act's legisla-
tive history, which stated that the provision "'grants to the franchising au-
thority the discretion to determine the number of cable operators to be
authorized to provide service in a particular geographic area.' 273 The
court in Preferred observed that while a city may issue franchises in order to
prevent disruption, it has no authority to decide how many franchises will be
issued as long as there is space available on the poles for additional systems.
The holding in Preferred must be seriously questioned because the Act
plainly states that a city may grant one franchise in a single region if it so
chooses.27 4 According to the Cable Act, it would seem that Los Angeles
would not be required to grant PCI a franchise nor would PCI be permitted
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
268. See supra note 31.
269. Cable Act, § 621(a)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985)).
270. Preferred, 754 F.2d at 1400 n.3.
271. Id. at 1411 n.1l.
272. Id.
273. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 31, at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4696).
274. Cable Act, § 621(a)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985)).
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to provide cable services without one.275 In Preferred, the court did not
adequately address the applicability of the Cable Act to the matter before it.
Incomprehensibly, it avoided any thoughtful discussion of its decision to dis-
miss this provision of the Cable Act out of hand. Regardless of whether the
court thought the Act did or did not have bearing on the issues in Preferred,
sound jurisprudence would dictate that the court address the matter in a
straightforward manner. Preferred may be rightly criticized for abdicating
its responsibility in this regard.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a city may not limit its franchise to one cable operator if space
exists for additional cable attachments. The court applied three distinct
analyses to arrive at this conclusion: the comparative media analysis, the
O'Brien test, and the public forum doctrine. Each of these analyses, to vary-
ing degrees, inadequately addressed the underlying question of to what ex-
tent the government may regulate the provision of cable service. The
comparative media analysis, while supplying helpful analogies, concentrates
too heavily on the existing similarities and dissimilarities of the media rather
than focusing on the unique attributes and corresponding needs of the cable
medium. In addition, although the O'Brien test has proved helpful to several
courts in achieving their desired ends, the test's applicability to the cable
industry is questionable due to the result-oriented manner in which it is uti-
lized. Further, the public forum test, while applicable to the question, must
be adapted to the problem with sensitivity to the fact that its outcome will
establish the degree to which the cable medium will be regulated.
Several courts have wrestled with the problem of determining the appro-
priate first amendment analysis to apply to the cable medium. Preferred
presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to finally elucidate the de-
gree of government regulation over the cable medium permitted by the first
amendment. Essentially, the Court must preserve the nature of the cable
medium and the first amendment interests at stake. It must be cognizant of
the legitimate and at times competing interests of cable operators, local gov-
ernments and the viewing public. Above all, the Court must stay true to the
essential purpose of the first amendment, which is to promote diversity of
ideas. In so doing, the Court will decide ultimately whether the private mar-
275. See supra note 29.
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ketplace or local governments should exercise control over the number of
franchises that will be granted to a particular region.
Rosemary B. Healy
